


Arthur-Merlin Games



Prover/Merlin can see Arthur's random coins

Def: An Arthur-Merlin protocol is an IP where the verifier's messages are the random strings (r_i) . There is no other randomness involved.

Merlin does not know random strings in advance.

Public Randomness

IP
private randomness

Def: $AM[k]$ is the class of languages decided by k -round Arthur-Merlin protocols.

$$AM \neq \bigcup_{c \in \mathbb{N}} AM[n^c]$$


$$\underline{IP} = \bigcup_{c \in \mathbb{N}} \underline{IP}[n^c]$$

AM[2]

AM/AM

MA

x



AM[2]

$x \in AM[2]$

if

\exists poly time TM A st.


- If $x \in L \Rightarrow \exists$ fn P st. $\Pr_r [A(x,r, P(x,r)) \text{ accepts}] \geq 2/3$
- If $x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall$ fn P st. $\Pr_r [A(x,r, P(x,r)) \text{ accepts}] < 1/3$

Def: Randomized Reduction

A fn. $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ is a randomized reduction from language \mathcal{L} to language \mathcal{M} s.t.

$$\Pr_r [\mathcal{M}(f(x,r)) = \mathcal{L}(x)] \geq 2/3$$

The reduction is efficient if $|r| \leq p(n)$
 $f(x,r)$ can be computed in poly time.



$\mathcal{L} \leq_r \mathcal{M}$ if there exists an efficient randomized reduction from \mathcal{L} to \mathcal{M} .

$$\text{B.P. INP} = \{ \mathcal{L} \mid \mathcal{L} \leq_r \text{SAT} \}$$

Clm: $\text{AIM}[2] = \text{B.P. INP}$

Proof: $[\subseteq]$ $\mathcal{L} \in \text{AIM}[2]$. \exists a 2-round Arthur-Merlin protocol.

Consider a randomized NTM R .

- (1) Flip $r \in \text{poly}(n)$ bits randomly
- (2) Non-deterministically write down string $\rightarrow P(x,r)$
- (3) Runs Arthur's computation $A(x,r,P(x,r))$

By Cook-Levin construction, there is a poly time computable formula ~~$\Phi(x,r)$~~ $\Phi_{x,r}(v)$ s.t. $\Phi_{x,r}$ is satisfiable iff R accepts (when x,r are fixed).

$x \in \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \exists \text{ fn } P \text{ s.t. } \Pr_r [A(x, r, P(x, r)) \text{ accepts}] \geq 2/3$

For at least a $2/3$ fraction of all choices of $r \in \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$

\exists a string P s.t. $A(x, r, P)$ accepts.

For at least $2/3$ fraction of choices of r , $R(x, r)$ accepts.

$$\Pr_r [\Phi_{x,r} \in \text{SAT}] \geq 2/3$$

$$\Phi_{x,r} \in \text{SAT}$$

$x \notin \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \forall \text{ fns } P \text{ s.t. } \Pr_r [A(x, r, P(x, r)) \text{ accepts}] \leq 1/3$

x is accepting seed if $A(x, r, P(x, r))$ accepts

rejecting seed if - - rejects.

For rejecting seed, $A(x, r, P(x, r))$ does NOT accept for any choice of $P(x, r)$

When machine R chooses a rejecting seed, R will not accept.

$$\Pr_r [\Phi_{x,r} \notin \text{SAT}] \geq 2/3$$

(non-det.) $\equiv \Phi_{x,r} \notin \text{SAT}$

Public vs Private Randomness?

Thm [Goldwasser-Sipser 87]: $\forall k \quad \mathbb{IP}[k] \subseteq \text{AM}[k+2]$

Thm [Babai-Moran 88]: $k \geq 2 \quad \text{AM}[k+1] \subseteq \text{AM}[k]$
(poly blow up)



$$\bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \mathbb{IP}[k] = \text{AM}[2] = \text{BP.NP} !$$

Thm: $GNI \in AM[2]$

Input $\langle G_0, G_1 \rangle$

Proof: Key idea $S = \{ H \mid H \cong G_0 \text{ or } H \cong G_1 \}$

Suppose G_0 and G_1 have no automorphism $\text{Aut}(G_i)$



If $G_0 \not\cong G_1$, $|S| = 2(n!)$
 If $G_0 \cong G_1$, $|S| = n!$

$$S = \{ (H, \sigma) \mid H \cong G_0 \text{ or } H \cong G_1 \text{ and } \sigma \in \text{Aut}(H) \}$$



There is a poly-sized efficiently ~~computable~~ ^{verifiable} certificate for membership in S . (The permutation leads to $H \cong G_0/G_1$)

~~$x \in L$~~

There is a set S s.t. membership in S is efficiently verifiable $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$

$x \in L \Rightarrow |S| \geq 2K$ $x \notin L \Rightarrow |S| \leq K$

GS: set lower bound protocol



Arthur :

- (1) Picks random hash fn. h
- (2) Pick random y in range $\{0,1\}^k$

Asks Merlin "give me $x \in S$ s.t. $h(x) = y$
 & give me certificate that $x \in S$."