

NL

PATH is NL-complete.

→ $\{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid G \text{ is a directed graph and there is a path from } s \text{ to } t \}$

Can we define NL in terms of certificates?
(NP can be defined in terms of polynomial verifiable certificates.)

Naive (incorrect) defn: (certificate viewpoint)


$L \in \text{NL}$ if \exists polynomial p & ~~logspace~~ ^{poly time} machine M
s.t. ~~$x \in L$~~ $\forall x \in \{0,1\}^*$

$x \in L \iff \exists y, |y| \leq p(|x|)$ s.t. $M(\langle x, y \rangle)$ accepts.

This defn. is incorrect!

In such a setting, we can decide 3SAT!

Given 3CNF Φ and a possible assignment $y \in \{0,1\}^*$, we can check if $\Phi(y) = 1$ in logspace.




Certificate say: set x_i to bit y_i

For each c_i , machine has to look value of literals in that clause, and check if c_i is satisfied. Machine only need logspace to look up these values.


By carefully looking Cook-Levin theorem / reduction, one can show $\forall L \in \text{NP}, L \leq_L \text{SAT}$

Thm: $L \in \text{NP}$ iff \exists poly p and logspace machine M st. $\forall x, x \in L \Leftrightarrow \exists y, |y| \leq p(|x|)$, st. $M(x, y)$ accepts.



Φ

$Z_{tix} \rightarrow$ Indicator that at time t , i^{th} symbol on tape is α .



$\Phi = \text{UNIQUE} \wedge \text{START} \wedge \text{ACCEPT} \wedge \text{MOVE}$

Individual clauses in Φ only depend on a constant number of variables.

Only the starting configuration depends on the input.

The right definition:


Define a tape to be READ-ONCE if head (on the tape) cannot write on the tape and head only moves right.



Thm

$L \in NL$ iff \exists poly p and logspace machine M s.t.

$\forall x \quad x \in L \Leftrightarrow \exists y, |y| \leq p(|x|)$ st
 $M(\langle x, y \rangle)$ accepts and
 x is on input tape and
 y is on a read-once tape.



Read-once
certificate

M cannot store
certificate in ~~work~~
workspace.

Logspace verifier

Standard certificate \Rightarrow INP

Read-one certificates

\equiv Non-determinism

Poly time verifier

Standard certificate \Rightarrow INP

	Verifier	
	Logspace	Polytime
Read-one cert.	INL	INP
Standard cert.	INP	INP

Cert. can be stored in workspace. Now, cert. becomes a standard cert.

Proof: Suppose $L \in \text{INL}$

(\Rightarrow) There is a NTM M running in logspace that (\Leftarrow) decides L . To get the verifier/certificate viewpoint, let certificate be the non-deterministic choices of a run of M .

The verifier M' simply runs M using the non-deterministic choices in the certificate. (M never needs to look back at previous non-deterministic choices.)

Certificate is $\text{poly}(n)$ sized because $L \subseteq P$.

(\Rightarrow) Consider L with a logspace verifier M' and read-once certificate. Create a NTM M that simulates M' and uses non-determinism to guess the next symbol of certificate. M' decides L . \square

The Immerman-Szelepcsenyi Theorem

$$NL = co-NL$$

Generally, $NSPACE(s(n)) = \overline{co-NSPACE(s(n))}$
 $\forall s(n) \geq \log n$, $s(n) = \Omega(\log n)$ (Padding argument)

PATH is NL-complete.

\overline{PATH} is co-NL-complete.

If we show $\overline{PATH} \in NL$, then we prove
 $NL = co-NL$. (Exercise)

$\overline{PATH} = \{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid G \text{ is directed and there is NO path from } s \text{ to } t \}$

PATH \in NL is "obvious", non-determinism/read-once cert. is the path.

How can non-determinism prove that there is NO path?

Thm: $\overline{\text{PATH}} \in \text{NHL}$

(poly-sized)

Proof: Think in terms of read-once certificates.

You'll go nuts thinking of a non-deterministic logspace machine.

Define $\overline{\text{PATH}}_i = \{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid \text{There is no path from } s \text{ to } t \text{ of length } \leq i \}$

Let $d(s, t)$ be shortest path distance from s to t

$\overline{\text{PATH}}_i = \{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid d(s, t) > i \}$ (dist is ∞ if there is no path)

$\overline{\text{PATH}}_{n-1} = \overline{\text{PATH}}$

We will use certificates (read-once) for $\overline{\text{PATH}}_i$ to construct read-once certificates for $\overline{\text{PATH}}_{i+1}$.

Iterative Counting (G is adjacency matrix)


$\overline{\text{PATH}}_0 = \{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid s \neq t \} \in \text{NL}$

$\overline{\text{PATH}}_1 = \{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid s \neq t, (s, t) \notin E \} \quad (G = (V, E))$

$\in \text{NL}$

single lookup in G .

$\overline{\text{PATH}}_2 = \{ \langle G, s, t \rangle \mid d(s, t) > 2 \}$



$\Gamma^+(v) = \text{outneighborhood}$

$\Gamma^-(v) = \text{in-neighborhood}$

$\Gamma^+(s) \cap \Gamma^-(t) = \emptyset$

$d(s,t) > 2$ iff $(\forall) v \in \Gamma^+(s), (v,t) \notin E$
 checked in logspace

First try: certificate is $\Gamma^+(s)$


(0) Check $(s,t) \notin E$ is v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k

Verifier: (1) For v in v_1, \dots, v_k Read once


(a) Check if $(s,v) \in E$. (Else reject)

(b) Check if $(v,t) \notin E$. (Else reject)

(2) Accept



What if there is some neighbor v' of s that is NOT in certificate?



The verifier can loop over all neighbors of s , but it cannot go back and check if they lie in certificate.


~~Cert~~ Certificate is $\overbrace{d_v^+}^{\log n} | v_1 | v_2 | \dots | v_k$

$v_1 < v_2 < \dots < v_k$ (prevent repeats)

Verifier: (1) Store d_v^+ from certificate in ~~workspace~~ workspace.

(2) Compute outdegree of v , check if it matches cert. (If not, reject)

(3) For v in v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k



(4) Check that $k = d_v^+$. If not, reject